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ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT: A 
“MEANINGFUL” OPPORTUNITY TO ALLEVIATE THE 
SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE FOR STUDENTS WITH 
DISABILITIES 
JASON LANGBERG & SARAH MORRIS† 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Brandon and Tyler are both sixth grade students with individualized 
education programs (IEPs) for their serious emotional disabilities. Pursu-
ant to his IEP, Brandon is in a behavioral support class that focuses on 
social and emotional learning for 60 minutes every day. He also receives 
psychological services twice a week and his parents receive counseling, 
twice a month, on how to work with Brandon. A behavioral intervention 
plan (BIP) that focuses on teaching replacement behaviors and reinforc-
ing positive behaviors is part of Brandon’s IEP. Finally, his IEP includes 
specific, measurable, and attainable behavioral goals. Tyler’s IEP, on the 
other hand, mirrors the boilerplate IEP given to most middle school stu-
dents with emotional disabilities in the district. It provides for 30 minutes 
of generic special education twice a month and no related services. Tyler 
has a BIP, but it focuses on punitive consequences. 
Brandon graduated from high school and earned a scholarship to 
college. Tyler spent the next few years frequently suspended, referred to 
law enforcement, and failing classes. He eventually dropped out of 
school and became ensnared in the prison industrial complex.  
The primary cause of the disparate outcomes for Brandon and Tyler 
was where they went to school. Under the current state of special educa-
tion law, as eligible students with disabilities (SWD), both were entitled 
to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). However, Brandon was 
entitled to “meaningful” services in his state, whereas Tyler was entitled 
to services that were only “just above trivial” in his state. 
The U.S. Supreme Court takes up this incongruity in its upcoming 
term, with implications well beyond the mere formulation of a consistent 
legal standard. Its decision in Endrew F. v. Douglas County School Dis-
trict1 will ultimately either worsen or alleviate the “school-to-prison 
pipeline” for SWD. 
  
 † Education and civil rights advocates in Colorado. The authors thank Charles Fine, Univer-
sity of Denver Sturm College of Law ’18, for his guidance and editing assistance. 
 1. 137 S. Ct. 29 (2016) (granting certiorari). 
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II. DEFINING “FREE APPROPRIATE PUBLIC EDUCATION” 
More than 90,000 students in Colorado, and more than 6.5 million 
students nationally (13% of the total public school enrollment),2 have one 
or more disabilities that entitle them to special rights under the Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).3 Among their entitlements, 
and at the core of special education, is the right to FAPE.4  
The right to FAPE for SWD was first articulated in the Education 
for All Handicapped Children Act, passed by Congress in 1975 and reau-
thorized as the IDEA in 1990.5 FAPE is defined in IDEA as: 
special education and related services that—(A) have been provided 
at public expense, under public supervision and direction, and with-
out charge; (B) meet the standards of the State educational agency; 
(C) include an appropriate preschool, elementary school, or second-
ary school education in the State involved; and (D) are provided in 
conformity with the individualized education program . . . .6 
Over the more than 40 years since the statute was adopted, the 
meaning of “appropriate” has been widely debated, misunderstood, and 
applied inconsistently. 
In 1982, in Board of Education v. Rowley,7 the U.S. Supreme Court 
issued its first and only ruling on the meaning of FAPE.8 The Court held 
that to be “appropriate,” an education must be reasonably calculated to 
confer “some educational benefit” upon the student.9 In so doing, the 
Court rejected the propositions that IDEA requires schools to “maximize 
the potential of” or “provide ‘equal’ educational opportunities” to 
SWD.10 Rowley set only a “basic floor of opportunity,” but not “any one 
test for determining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred up-
on” SWD entitled to FAPE.11 Ultimately, then, Rowley accomplished 
little in the way of clarifying the meaning of FAPE.  
Consequently, lower courts labored to define this “basic floor of 
opportunity.” As the briefs currently before the Supreme Court in En-
drew F. summarize: 
  
 2. Children and Youth with Disabilities, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT., 
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/coe/indicator_cgg.asp (last updated May 2016); COLO. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
FUNDED PUPIL COUNT (2015), https://www.cde.state.co.us/cdesped/dec2015_fundedpupilcount. 
 3. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–82 (2012). 
 4. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 300.101 (2016). 
 5. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THIRTY-FIVE YEARS OF PROGRESS IN EDUCATING CHILDREN WITH 
DISABILITIES THROUGH IDEA 1, 6 (2010), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osers/idea35/history/idea-35-history.pdf (providing a sum-
mary history of IDEA). 
 6. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(9). 
 7. 458 U.S. 176 (1982). 
 8. Id. at 187. 
 9. Id. at 200, 203–04. 
 10. Id. at 189, 198. 
 11. Id. at 201–02. 
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Two circuits [the Third and Sixth] hold that IEPs must be calculated 
to confer on students with disabilities a substantial educational bene-
fit, which they refer to as a “meaningful educational benefit.” Five 
other circuits [the Tenth, Fourth, First, Seventh, and Eleventh] ex-
pressly acknowledge their disagreement with this higher standard and 
hold that Rowley requires only a just-above-trivial educational bene-
fit. Three circuits [the Second, Fifth, and Eighth] appear to apply the 
just-above-trivial standard but have not expressly rejected the higher 
standard. The Ninth Circuit is internally conflicted, with different 
panels aligning themselves with opposite sides of the circuit split. 
The D.C. Circuit has not described the required level of benefit.12 
The chasm in the educational outcomes permissible under the 
“meaningful” versus the “just-above-trivial” standards is illustrated in a 
comparison of two cases. 
In Ridgewood Board of Education v. N.E. ex rel. M.E.,13 the Third 
Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with a student who tested in third 
grade in the ninety-fifth percentile for intelligence but tested only in the 
second percentile for reading, and had consistently failed to make aca-
demic progress, and had grown increasingly anxious and depressed.14 
That student finally received an IEP in eighth grade, but that IEP proved 
ineffective, with the student making minimal improvements and the 
school board changing his grades to pass–fail, purportedly to minimize 
the impact of failing on his self-esteem.15 Both the school board and the 
district court determined that, despite these results, the student had re-
ceived FAPE.16 In reviewing this issue, the Third Circuit reiterated its 
previous holding “that IDEA ‘calls for more than a trivial educational 
benefit’ and requires a satisfactory IEP to provide ‘significant learning’ 
and confer ‘meaningful benefit,’” as determined using a careful, individ-
ualized “student-by-student analysis.”17 Using this framework, the Third 
Circuit remanded the student’s case, finding that the district court failed 
to review for “significant learning” and “meaningful benefit” or perform 
a sufficiently individualized analysis.18 
By contrast, in E.S. v. Independent School District, No. 196,19 the 
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals required no such showing of significant 
or meaningful benefits.20 The case involved a seventh grader with dys-
lexia seeking an order adding one-to-one tutoring using a specific in-
  
 12. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *10, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, No. 15-
827 (U.S. Dec. 22, 2015), 2015 WL 9412874. 
 13. 172 F.3d 238 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 14. Id. at 243–45. 
 15. Id. at 243–44. 
 16. Id. at 244. 
 17. Id. at 247–48. 
 18. Id. at 248. 
 19. 135 F.3d 566 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 20. See id. at 569. 
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structional method to her IEP.21 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s denial of such an order, finding that the student received suffi-
cient academic benefit based on the following standardized test results 
over three years: her broad reading skills rose from a 3.0 to a 3.8 grade-
level equivalent; her reading comprehension rose from a 3.2 to a 5.1 
grade level; her broad written language rose from a 2.7 to a 3.1 grade 
level; and her writing skills rose from a 2.1 to a 3.8 grade level.22 Thus, 
the Eighth Circuit found that a seventh grader, testing at, on average, a 
third-grade level, who had made only the slightest amount of progress in 
three years, had received FAPE.23 
As these courts and others labored and reached inconsistent results, 
SWD continued experiencing marginalization, low expectations, under-
resourced schools, and unmet needs.24 Additionally, a relatively new 
barrier confronts SWD: the “school-to-prison pipeline.”25  
III. STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON 
PIPELINE 
The school-to-prison pipeline is a system of laws, policies, and 
practices—such as exclusionary disciplinary and school policing—that 
pushes students out of school and onto a path toward the juvenile and 
criminal systems.26 Nationally and in Colorado, SWD are disproportion-
ately trapped in this pipeline; they are suspended, expelled, referred to 
law enforcement, and subjected to school-related arrests with greater 
  
 21. Id. at 568. 
 22. Id. at 569. 
 23. See also K.E. ex rel. K.E. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 15, 647 F.3d 795, 810 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(finding FAPE provided even where student “fail[ed] to meet some of her IEP goals” and her “test 
results d[id] not demonstrate the level of growth that is typical for children of her grade level”); Amy 
J. Goetz, Tammy L. Pust & Atlee Reilly, The Devolution of the Rowley Standard in the Eighth 
Circuit: Protecting the Right to a Free and Appropriate Public Education by Advocating for Stand-
ards-Based IEPs, 34 HAMLINE L. REV. 503, 519–24 (2011) (collecting Eighth Circuit cases that 
“reflect an apparent judicial satisfaction with almost any level of progress, no matter how negligible 
or inferential”).  
 24. NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ADDRESSING THE NEEDS OF YOUTH WITH DISABILITIES 
IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE CURRENT STATUS OF EVIDENCE-BASED RESEARCH 26–28 
(2013), http://www.ncd.gov/rawmedia_repository/381fe89a_6565_446b_ba18_bad024a59476.pdf. 
 25. See, e.g., Sarah E. Redfield & Jason P. Nance, American Bar Association: Joint Task 
Force on Reversing the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 47 U. MEM. L. REV. 1, 60–71 (2016); Jackie 
Mader & Sarah Butrymowicz, Pipeline to Prison: Special Education Too Often Leads to Jail for 
Thousands of American Children, HECHINGER REP. (Oct. 26, 2014), 
http://hechingerreport.org/pipeline-prison-special-education-often-leads-jail-thousands-american-
children/; Julianne Hing, Race, Disability and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, COLORLINES (May 13, 
2014, 7:00 AM), http://www.colorlines.com/articles/race-disability-and-school-prison-pipeline. 
 26. See, e.g., Barbara Fedders & Jason Langberg, School Discipline Reform: Incorporating 
the Supreme Court’s “Age Matters” Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 933, 950–68 (2013); 
Jason B. Langberg & Barbara A. Fedders, How Juvenile Defenders Can Help Dismantle the School-
to-Prison Pipeline: A Primer on Educational Advocacy and Incorporating Clients' Education Histo-
ries and Records into Delinquency Representation, 42 J.L. & EDUC. 653, 653–62 (2013); Jason P. 
Nance, Students, Police, and the School-to-Prison Pipeline, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 919, 929–57 
(2016). 
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frequency than their peers without disabilities.27 Such disparities run 
afoul of one of Congress’ primary purposes in passing IDEA—
preventing schools from excluding SWD.28 
According to data from the Office for Civil Rights of the U.S. De-
partment of Education, SWD in public schools across the nation are more 
than twice as likely to receive one or more out-of-school suspensions 
than students without disabilities.29 Moreover, they represent approxi-
mately a quarter of students subjected to school-related arrests, even 
though they are only about 13% of the total student population.30 In Col-
orado, during the 2011–2012 school year, SWD were 10.8% of the total 
student population but 17.9% of students suspended out-of-school, 
17.8% of students expelled, 18.0% of students referred to law enforce-
ment, and 24.4% of students with school-related arrests.31 
Discipline disparities are even more pronounced when examining 
intersections of disability, race, and gender. For example, nationwide, 
more than one quarter of black, male SWD receive one or more out-of-
school suspensions, compared to just two percent of white, female stu-
dents without disabilities.32 Not coincidentally, black males with disabili-
ties are typically the most overrepresented group in juvenile justice sys-
tems.33 
IV. ENDREW F. V. DOUGLAS COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT 
In January 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court will hear a case, Endrew 
F. v. Douglas County School District, which will impact the representa-
tion of SWD in the pipeline. The specific question before the Court will 
be: “What is the level of educational benefit that school districts must 
  
 27. Office for Civil Rights, Civil Rights Data Collection, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://ocrdata.ed.gov/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 28. Joseph B. Tulman & Kylie A. Schofield, Reversing the School-to-Prison Pipeline: Initial 
Findings from the District of Columbia on the Efficacy of Training and Mobilizing Court-Appointed 
Lawyers to Use Special Education Advocacy on Behalf of at-Risk Youth, 18 U.D.C. L. REV. 215, 216 
(2015) (citing Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 327 (1988)); see also Honig, 484 U.S. at 327 (“[O]ne of 
the evils Congress sought to remedy [via IDEA] was the unilateral exclusion of disabled children 
by schools”)). One of the cases that led to the passage of IDEA, Mills v. Board of Education, 348 F. 
Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972), struck down the District of Columbia’s refusal to educate “exceptional” 
children and its practice of excluding them without due process. Bd. Of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 
176, 180 n.2 (1982) (“Two cases, . . . [including Mills], were later identified as the most prominent 
of the cases contributing to Congress’ enactment of the Act and the statutes which preceded it.” 
(citations omitted)); Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 876. 
 29. Office for Civil Rights, Civil Rights Data Collection, U.S. DEP’T EDUC., 
http://ocrdata.ed.gov/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2017). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. See, e.g., Amanda Merkwae, Note, Schooling the Police: Race, Disability, and the Con-
duct of School Resource Officers, 21 MICH. J. RACE & L. 147, 151–57 (2015); Andrea J. Sedlak & 
Carol Bruce, Youth’s Characteristics and Backgrounds, JUVENILE JUSTICE BULLETIN, Dec. 2010, at 
1, 2–7, https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/227730.pdf. 
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confer on [SWD] to provide them with the [FAPE] guaranteed by the 
[IDEA]?”34 
Endrew F., the plaintiff in the case, is a student with autism.35 He at-
tended public school in Douglas County, Colorado from preschool 
through fourth grade, with an IEP each year.36 He began experiencing 
behavioral problems in second and third grade, which grew more severe 
and included self-harming behaviors by fourth grade.37 The family and 
the school district agree that these behaviors interfered with Endrew’s 
ability to learn, as evidenced, for example, by his regular removals from 
the classroom and by the minimal progress he made toward the goals in 
his IEP.38 His proposed fifth-grade IEP included roughly the same goals 
and objectives as those in his previous years’ IEPs.39 Citing his lack of 
behavioral and academic progress, his parents rejected the proposed IEP 
for fifth grade, withdrew him from public school, placed him in a private 
school specializing in autism, and sought tuition reimbursement from the 
school district under IDEA.40  
The case began with Endrew’s parents seeking tuition reimburse-
ment before an administrative law judge and then federal district and 
circuit courts.41 They argued that the fifth-grade IEP denied him FAPE 
because it was not reasonably calculated to provide educational benefit.42 
Each forum found against the family, finding that reimbursement was not 
required because “some educational benefit” had been provided.43 At the 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, Endrew argued that, in a recent opinion, 
the Tenth Circuit had adopted the higher standard used by other cir-
cuits.44 The Court rejected this reading of the prior opinion, acknowledg-
ing, but declining to adopt, the other circuits’ higher standard and hewing 
to its own interpretation of Rowley as requiring only any educational 
benefit that is “more than de minimis.”45 
The case has united special education and disability rights advo-
cates, scores of which have filed amicus briefs in support of a higher 
FAPE standard. The United States (i.e., the federal government), 118 
  
 34. Brief for Petitioner at *i, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, No. 15-827 (U.S. 
Nov. 14, 2016), 2016 WL 6769009. 
 35. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *6, Endrew F., No. 15-827, 2015 WL 9412874. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at *6–7. 
 39. Id. at *7. 
 40. Id.; Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1333 (10th Cir. 2015); see 
20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148. 
 41. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *7–8, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, No. 15-
827 (Dec. 22 2015), 2015 WL 9412874; Endrew F., 798 F.3d 1329; Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. 
Dist. Re-1, 2014 WL 4548439 (D. Colo. Sept. 15, 2014). 
 42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *7–8, Endrew F., No. 15-827, 2015 WL 9412874. 
 43. Id. at *7–9. 
 44. Endrew F., 798 F.3d at 1338–40 (citing Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R–1 v. Elizabeth E. ex 
rel. Roxanne B., 702 F.3d 1227 (10th Cir. 2012)). 
 45. Id. 
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members of Congress, three states, and the National Education Associa-
tion, among others, also filed amicus briefs in support of a higher stand-
ard.46 Those who oppose a higher FAPE standard, including the National 
School Boards Association, the School Superintendents Association, and 
the Colorado Department of Education, argue that revisiting a standard 
that has been working well for 30 years will cause disruption, including, 
they predict, higher costs resulting from the provision of greater benefits 
to SWD and an opening of the floodgates to litigation to further define 
any new standard.47 
V. POTENTIAL IMPACT 
The Court’s decision will likely impact SWD’s representation in the 
pipeline in four primary ways. 
First, there is a close nexus between behavior and academic en-
gagement, rigor, and performance.48 The more “appropriate” the educa-
tion of a student with a disability, the more likely she is to abide by 
rules.49 On the flip side, SWD who do not receive adequate supports and 
services are more likely to engage in misconduct and, in turn, “are more 
likely to end up suspended, to be referred to alternative schools, or to 
become court-involved.”50 Thus, it stands to reason that a higher standard 
  
 46. See Endrew F. v. Douglas County School District, SCOTUSBLOG, 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/endrew-f-v-douglas-county-school-district/ (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2017) (listing amici briefs filed by these and other amici).  
 47. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition to Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 10–25, 27, Endrew F. 
v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, No. 15-827 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2016) (contending that the circuit split 
“is one of adjectives, not outcomes” and suggesting that delineation of a new standard would inject 
uncertainty into the 6.5 million IEPs created each year); John Aguilar, U.S. Supreme Court Will 
Hear Douglas County Student With Disabilities Case, DENV. POST (Dec. 28, 2016), 
http://www.denverpost.com/2016/09/29/supreme-court-douglas-county-student-disabilities-case/ 
(comments of Colorado Association of School Boards); Mark Keierleber, Why Advocates Hope the 
Supreme Court Will Save Special Education, 74 MILLION (Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://www.the74million.org/article/why-advocates-hope-the-supreme-court-will-save-special-
education (same); cf. Brief for National Association of State Directors of Special Education as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Neither Party at 6–12, Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re-1, No. 15-827 
(U.S. Nov. 17, 2016) (arguing that Rowley works in practice, because the practice is to provide a 
more meaningful than trivial FAPE).  
 48. Ivory A. Toldson, Tyne McGee & Brianna P. Lemmons, Reducing Suspensions by Im-
proving Academic Engagement Among School-Age Black Males, in CLOSING THE SCHOOL 
DISCIPLINE GAP 107–17, (Daniel J. Losen, ed., 2015); CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION & 
PRACTICE, PREVENTION STRATEGIES THAT WORK: WHAT ADMINISTRATORS CAN DO TO PROMOTE 
POSITIVE STUDENT BEHAVIOR 8–9, http://cecp.air.org/preventionstrategies/prevent.pdf; Robert F. 
Putnam, Robert H. Horner & Robert Algozzine, Academic Achievement and the Implementation of 
School-wide Behavior Support, POSITIVE BEHAV. INTERVENTIONS & SUPPORTS, 
https://www.pbis.org/common/cms/files/Newsletter/Volume3%20Issue1.pdf (last visited Jan. 11, 
2017). 
 49. Yael Cannon, Michael Gregory & Julie Waterstone, A Solution Hiding in Plain Sight: 
Special Education and Better Outcomes for Students with Social, Emotional, and Behavioral Chal-
lenges, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 403, 412 (2013); Joseph B. Tulman & Douglas M. Weck, Shutting 
Off the School-to-Prison Pipeline for Status Offenders with Education-Related Disabilities, 54 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 875, 878 (2009/2010). 
 50. CATHERINE Y. KIM, DANIEL J. LOSEN & DAMON T. HEWITT, THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON 
PIPELINE: STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 55 (2012); Cannon, Gregory & Waterstone, supra note 49, 
at 412–25; Tulman & Schofield, supra note 28, at 220; Tulman & Weck, supra note 49, at 878.  
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for FAPE, and the resulting benefits, will help stem the flow of SWD 
into the pipeline. 
Effective behavior management tools already in IDEA that may be 
more seriously considered essential to an “appropriate” education under 
heightened FAPE scrutiny, and thus utilized with greater frequency, in-
clude:51 special education, such as affective needs classrooms with social 
skills programming;52 related services, such as counseling and psycho-
logical services;53 supplementary aids and services, such as one-on-one 
paraprofessionals;54 nonacademic services, such as referrals to mental 
health agencies;55 and functional behavioral assessments and behavioral 
intervention plans.56 
Second, SWD who experience “a change of placement” because of 
disciplinary removals have an ongoing entitlement to FAPE after the 
change.57 A change in placement occurs if the student is subjected to: (a) 
removal for more than ten consecutive school days (e.g., expulsion) or 
(b) a series of removals (e.g., multiple short-term suspensions) that con-
stitute a pattern and total more than ten school days in a single school 
year.58 Typically, school districts deliver, or at least purport to deliver, 
FAPE to removed SWD through placements in alternative schools, in-
school centers, private programs (e.g., day treatment centers), online 
classes, or home-based services.59  
These alternatives, however, tend to further feed the school-to-
prison pipeline.60 A higher standard for what is considered “appropriate” 
  
 51. See generally Office of Special Educ. & Rehab. Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Col-
league Letter on Supporting Behavior of Students with Disabilities (Aug. 1, 2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/school-discipline/files/dcl-on-pbis-in-ieps--08-01-2016.pdf; 
THE S. DISABILITY LAW CTR., KEEPING STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES IN SCHOOL: LEGAL 
STRATEGIES AND EFFECTIVE EDUCATIONAL PRACTICES FOR PREVENTING THE SUSPENSION OF 
STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES (2014); Tulman & Weck, supra note 49, at 902–05. 
 52. 34 C.F.R. § 300.39. 
 53. Id. § 300.34; see Cannon, Gregory & Waterstone, supra note 49, at 458–62. 
 54. 34 C.F.R. § 300.42. 
 55. Id. § 300.107(b). 
 56. Id. § 300.530(d)(1)(ii); see Cannon, Gregory & Waterstone, supra note 49, at 466–74; 
Stephanie M. Poucher, Comment, The Road to Prison is Paved with Bad Evaluations: The Case for 
Functional Behavioral Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 471, 517–
21 (2015) (arguing for more specific standards as to when BIPs and FBAs are required). 
 57. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(D)(i); 34 C.F.R. § 300.530(d)(1)(i). SWD may be treated like 
other students up until the eleventh day of removal. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(B); 34 C.F.R. § 
300.530(b)(1). 
 58. 34 C.F.R. § 300.536. 
 59. See LAUDAN Y. ARON, THE URBAN INST., AN OVERVIEW OF ALTERNATIVE EDUCATION 
3–11 (2006), http://ncee.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/OverviewAltEd.pdf; PRISCILLA ROUSE 
CARVER, LAURIE LEWIS & PETER TICE, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ALTERNATIVE 
SCHOOLS AND PROGRAMS FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL STUDENTS AT RISK OF EDUCATIONAL FAILURE: 
2007–08, at 1–2, A-6 (2010), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2010/2010026.pdf; Alternative Education, 
COLO. DEP’T EDUC., https://www.cde.state.co.us/dropoutprevention/alternativeeducation (last visit-
ed Jan. 11, 2016). 
 60. See LAURA MCCARGAR, INVISIBLE STUDENTS: THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE AND ADULT 
EDUCATION IN THE CONNECTICUT SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE 29–32 (2011), 
http://www.kidscounsel.org/ABWF_PROP_InvisibleStudentsFinal.pdf; AUGUSTINA H. REYES, 
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will inch disciplinary alternative schools and programs closer toward 
fulfilling one of their primary goals—reengaging and rehabilitating stu-
dents with behavioral issues. Additionally, the more that alternative 
schools and programs fulfill this intended purpose, the more likely that 
SWD they serve will be able to successfully reenter traditional schools 
and graduate, rather than falling deeper into the pipeline.61 The same can 
be said for the provision of FAPE in correctional facilities.62 
Third, the nebulousness of FAPE to date has resulted in confusion 
and misunderstanding about the entitlement and lack of implementation, 
particularly with regard to what constitutes a disability and how SWD 
should be identified, served, and disciplined.63 Because educators strug-
gle to implement legal standards that Congress and courts have left ill-
defined, the default for IEPs often becomes merely what is available, 
affordable, or easiest.64 Clarity and specificity from the Court ought to 
begin to allow IEP teams to better understand and focus on providing an 
“appropriate” education for SWD.  
  
DISCIPLINE, ACHIEVEMENT, & RACE: IS ZERO TOLERANCE THE ANSWER? 47–69 (2006); Judi 
Vanderhaar, Marco Munoz & Joseph Petrosko, Reconsidering the Alternatives: The Relationship 
Between Suspension, Disciplinary Alternative School Placement, Subsequent Juvenile Detention, 
and the Salience of Race, 5 J. APPLIED RES. ON CHILD.: INFORMING POL’Y FOR CHILD. RISK, no. 2, 
2014, at 1. 
 61. See, e.g., Michele L. Beatty, Note, Not a Bad Idea: The Increasing Need to Clarify Free 
Appropriate Public Education Provisions Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 46 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 529, 548 (2013) (“Without a clear definition of FAPE, states are free to follow 
the minimal standards set forth in Rowley, and have no solid guidelines requiring them to ensure 
students receive the same level of ‘appropriate’ education while excluded from their regular set-
ting.”). 
 62. Office of Special Educ. & Rehab. Servs., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Dear Colleague Letter 
(Dec. 5, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/correctional-education/idea-letter.pdf; Access 
to Quality Education, JUV. L. CTR., http://jlc.org/current-initiatives/protecting-incarcerated-
youth/access-quality-education (last updated Nov. 16, 2015). 
 63. See Cannon, Gregory & Waterstone, supra note 49, at 409; Anna P. Goettl, Emptying 
Classrooms to Fill Detention Centers: The Disappointing Discipline Standards Under IDEA, 9 FED. 
CTS. L. REV. 41, 44–48, 51–54 (2016).  
 64. Case law and literature shows how this has played out in several contexts relevant to the 
pipeline. Use and implementation of FBAs and BIPs is one. See, e.g., Alex R. ex rel. Beth R. v. 
Forrestville Valley Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. # 221, 375 F.3d 603, 615 (7th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
neither the IDEA nor regulations set substantive standards for BIPs and, thus, the plaintiff’s BIP 
“could not have fallen short of substantive criteria that do not exist”); NAT’L COUNCIL ON 
DISABILITY, BREAKING THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE FOR STUDENTS WITH DISABILITIES 8 
(2015), http://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/Documents/NCD_School-to-PrisonReport_508-
PDF.pdf (“The confusing disciplinary provisions added and refined in the last two IDEA reauthori-
zations have allowed schools to ignore their overarching obligation to provide a . . .FAPE[], particu-
larly the requirement to consider behavioral supports in the IEP.”); Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for 
Functional Behavior Assessments and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 
Seattle U. L.R. 175, 202–03, 209 (2011), 
http://digitalcommons.law.seattleu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2060&context=sulr (surveying 
FBA and BIP case law and decisions and finding that lack of specificity in legal standards led to ad 
hoc results, based on the individual evidence in the case or reliance on expert witness testimony). 
Discipline, and FAPE requirements as to process and substance in the context of discipline is anoth-
er. See Beatty, supra note 61, at 548; Goettl, supra note 63, at 52 (explaining that misunderstanding 
of the IDEA’s disciplinary provisions results in “school officials . . . tend[ing] to err on the side of 
caution and defer behavior-related issues in [SWD] directly to the police”). 
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Fourth, the Court may shift the culture of special education and 
treatment of SWD, for better or worse, by the signals sent to educators, 
parents, and SWD in its decision. As explained in Section II, supra, the 
right to FAPE currently rests at a “basic floor.”65 If the Court elects to 
mandate more “meaningful” educational benefits for every SWD in the 
country, its decision may prove to be a landmark in a strengthening of 
the entitlement to FAPE over time.66  
VI. LIMITATIONS AND POTENTIAL UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
Realistically, a decision in Endrew F.’s favor will not be a panacea 
for SWD. Most broadly, a decision endorsing a “meaningful” right to 
FAPE nevertheless endorses the system of which it is a part, the same 
system that produces and tolerates the disparate outcomes discussed su-
pra in Section III.67 Even if the Court adopts the higher standard in En-
  
 65. See, e.g., supra note 23. The language used by some of these courts to describe the right to 
FAPE shows the minimal regard for its requirements. Perhaps most egregiously, the Eleventh Circuit 
has suggested that, because before the IDEA, SWD might not have received any education at all, 
they ought to be, and FAPE was, satisfied with the scraps from Rowley’s “floor.” JSK ex rel. JK v. 
Hendry Cty. Sch. Bd., 941 F.2d 1563, 1573 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding that even “the basic floor of 
opportunity . . . provides significant value to the handicapped child who, before [IDEA], might 
otherwise have been excluded from any educational opportunity”); see also, e.g., D.B. ex rel. Eliza-
beth B. v. Esposito, 675 F.3d 26, 37 (1st Cir. 2012) (finding no need for “a determination as to a 
child's potential for learning and self-sufficiency” before proceeding to determine whether his “IEP 
complies with the IDEA”); Thompson R2–J Sch. Dist. v. Luke P., 540 F.3d 1143, 1149 (10th Cir. 
2008) (explaining Rowley’s standard as “not an onerous one”); A.B. ex rel. D.B. v. Lawson, 354 
F.3d 315, 330 (4th Cir. 2004) (observing that “IDEA's FAPE standards are far more modest than to 
require that a child excel or thrive” and endorsing a result that provided much less). Even cases with 
less problematic language observe that Rowley does not provide them with the tools to require better 
results. The Tenth Circuit illustrated this in Endrew F., finding that even though it was a “close 
case,” there was sufficient evidence of some progress to meet Rowley’s “modest[],” standard. En-
drew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist. Re–1, 798 F.3d 1329, 1342 (10th Cir. 2015). 
 66. Under this theory, FAPE could follow in the footsteps of, for example, the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel for criminal defendants. See generally Stephen F. Smith, The Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel: Taking Strickland Claims Seriously, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 515 (2009) 
(analyzing how Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), established that right, but it lan-
guished until strengthened by a trilogy of cases years later); Barbara Fedders, Losing Hold of the 
Guiding Hand: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Juvenile Delinquency Representation, 14 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 771, 815–16 (2010) (same). The Strickland line of cases is a particularly apt 
example, as Strickland, like Rowley, provided lower courts little to go on in enforcing the right, 
leading to judicial deferral to professional norms and endorsement of unimpressive outcomes. See 
Smith, supra, at 521–26. As occurred with Strickland, see id. at 543, Endrew F. could be the first in 
a series to move toward a higher standard, and thus an increase in successful IDEA claims—or, 
better yet, educational outcomes for SWD without the need for legal representation. 
 67. See generally Tamar R. Birckhead, Juvenile Justice Reform 2.0, 20 J.L. & POL'Y 15, 33, 
39–45 (2011) (summarizing critiques of Brown v. Board of Education’s transformative power and 
analyzing how In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), which extended due process rights to juveniles in 
delinquency proceedings, serves “as an example of what happens when courts serve an ideological 
function of luring a movement for social reform to an institution that is structurally constrained from 
serving its needs, providing only an illusion of change” (internal quotation marks and citation omit-
ted)); Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176 
(2013) (examining how the procedural right to counsel, in part, legitimizes and hinders solutions to 
systemic issues in the criminal justice system); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between 
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997) (dissecting how systems “can 
adjust to [court-ordered] rules in ways other than obeying them. And the rules can in turn respond to 
the systemin a variety of ways, not all of them pleasant”). 
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drew F., systems still will not be obligated to “maximize the potential of” 
or “provide equal educational opportunities” to SWD.68 Additionally, 
regardless of the outcome in Endrew F., public schools will almost cer-
tainly continue to lack the resources necessary to deliver the individual-
ized educational services to SWD envisioned by IDEA69 and parents will 
still struggle to enforce the rights of SWD.70 
If the Court does adopt a higher standard, more “meaningful” out-
comes may nevertheless not result because there may be an unintended, 
negative recalibration of schools’ approach to IDEA. For instance, 
schools may attempt to reduce the number of students deemed eligible 
for services so as to avoid FAPE obligations altogether.71 Consequently, 
the likelihood of unidentified SWD becoming ensnared in the pipeline, 
for now, will not change; in fact, the odds will rise as the numbers of 
these unidentified students rise. 
Conversely, if the Court adopts the “just-above-trivial” standard, it 
will further reinforce the “low expectations” that drove Congress to 
adopt the IDEA in the first place.72 Furthermore, a “just-above-trivial” 
standard would maintain or exacerbate socioeconomic achievement gaps 
(or opportunity gaps) among SWD. That is because more affluent fami-
lies can afford to live in districts with greater resources for special educa-
tion, to pay advocates when their SWD are not academically progressing, 
to enroll in private schools that specialize in SWD, and to supplement 
school with extra services, such as afterschool tutoring and summer pro-
grams. They can also pay attorneys to litigate FAPE issues. Low-wealth 
families, on the other hand, are more likely to attend under-resourced 
schools and to be unable to afford skilled advocates to enhance FAPE.73 
Moreover, some of the mechanisms for remedies in IDEA, such as pri-
vate school tuition reimbursement,74 have limited efficacy for families 
without substantial resources.75 In short, the minimum FAPE require-
ment, however it is defined, acts as a safety net for economically disad-
  
 68. Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198–99 (1982). 
 69. See, e.g., Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren’t Enough: External Advocacy in Special 
Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1824–26 (2008). 
 70. See, e.g., id. at 1827–37. 
 71. See Cannon, Gregory & Waterstone, supra note 49, at 415–16, 436–47 (discussing myriad 
ways in which SWD are not identified, or are incompletely or improperly identified); Goettl, supra 
note 63, at 51 n.72, 55 n.110 (discussing consequences of failure to properly identify SWD). 
 72. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(4) (“[I]implementation of [the IDEA] has been impeded by low 
expectations.”). 
 73. See, e.g., Goettl, supra note 63, at 51 (“[M]any families cannot afford a lawyer to interpret 
IDEA for them or to help them through the complaint process”); Margaret M. Wakelin, Challenging 
Disparities in Special Education: Moving Parents from Disempowered Team Members to Ardent 
Advocates, 3 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL'Y 263, 278, 281 (2008). 
 74. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C); 34 C.F.R. § 300.148. 
 75. See Cannon, Gregory & Waterstone, supra note 49, at 411 (quoting RUTH COLKER, 
DISABLED EDUCATION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION 
ACT 239 (2013)); Elisa Hyman, Dean Hill Rivkin & Stephen A. Rosenbaum, How IDEA Fails 
Families Without Means: Causes and Corrections from the Frontlines of Special Education Lawyer-
ing, 20 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 107, 121–30 (2011).  
12 DENVER LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
vantaged SWD; defining it as “just-above-trivial” further entrenches 
those students at the bottom of the food chain. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Ideally, the Supreme Court will choose the higher standard for 
FAPE in Endrew F. and, in turn, reduce the number of SWD in the 
school-to-prison pipeline. Regardless of the Court’s decision, however, 
Congress, states, districts, and schools could voluntarily raise standards 
for educating SWD. Doing so would not only be in the best interests of 
students, but also would help improve school climate and safety and stu-
dent achievement and graduation rates. After all, school officials often 
justify their actions under the in loco parentis (“in place of the parent”) 
doctrine,76 and what parent wants anything but the highest quality educa-
tion for her child?  
Realistically though, a more radical and holistic approach to elimi-
nating disproportionality and dismantling the pipeline for SWD—one 
that involves adequate and equitable funding, robust oversight and en-
forcement of SWD’s rights,77 reforms related to school policing, and 
developmentally appropriately school discipline—will be needed. This 
approach will only come from zealous advocacy on the local, state, and 
national levels by students, parents, educators, and disability rights and 
education justice activists. 
  
 76. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 413–14 (2007); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. 
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986); 
New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336 (1985); see also Susan Stuart, In Loco Parentis in the 
Public Schools: Abused, Confused, and in Need of Change, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 969, 974–83 (2010). 
 77. Not limited to rights under the IDEA, but including such rights as those under section 504 
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794; Titles II and/or III of the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131, 12181; and applicable state civil rights or other laws. 
